This paper explores the various policies implemented in Italy to foster innovative activities and to regulate the technological effects on market competition and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Research promotion has primarily taken the form of facilitated credits and grants to stimulate R&D...

This paper analyzes banks' choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with other banks, when firms and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher...

This paper analyses the relation between competition and concentration in the banking sector. The empirical answer is given by testing a monopolistic competition model of bank branching behaviour on individual bank data at county level (départements and provinces) in France and Italy. We...

We study the relationship between the risk of default and Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) factors using Supervised Machine Learning (SML) techniques on a cross-section of European listed companies. Our proxy for credit risk is the z-score originally proposed by Altman (1968). We...

When a firm has external debt and monitoring by shareholders is essential, managerial bonuses are shown to be an optimal solution. A small managerial bonus linked to firm's performance not only reduces moral hazard between managers and shareholders, but also between creditors and monitoring...

This paper is about the corporate structure, the organizational structure, and the financial structure of firms, and how they relate to each other. We show that separation of ownership and control may arise as a response to overload costs, although it involves agency costs, and that...

This paper analyzes banks' choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with other banks, when firms and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher...