A dynamic process underlying firms' discrete financial choices has previously been found, but without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, this dependence can either be of a true nature or an effect of firm-specific characteristics that we cannot observe. This study extends previous...

We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the...

This paper analyzes the effects of symmetric and asymmetric taxation on performance-based versus fixed remuneration contracts. I integrate a proportional corporation tax and a proportional wage tax into a binary principal-agent model. The wage tax increases the remuneration costs and makes the...

Controlling employees can have severe consequences in situations that are not fully contractible. However, the perception of control may be contingent on the nature of the relationship between principal and agent. We, therefore, propose a principal-agent model of control that takes into account...

Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to raise his effort level whereas the ?crowding-out? literature suggests that it may reduce the overall work effort. These two assertions are not necessarily contradictory provided that the nature of the...

If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long-term employment is risky, with the risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long-term employment can result either from offering long-term contracts or from repeatedly and mutually opting for rematching....

Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that labor's interest may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based...

The paper investigates young firms' choice of capital source. Our theoretical model hypothesizes a positive (negative) relation between riskiness of the project (price of venture capital) and receiving informed equity. We test our predictions by employing a unique data set collected by KfW...

We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogeneous firms choose among two alternative instruments of external finance - corporate bonds and bank loans. We characterize the financing choice of firms and the endogenous financial structure of the economy. The...

We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs, where heterogenous firms choose among two alternative instruments of external finance - coporate bonds and bank loans. We characterize the financing choice of firms and the endogeous financial structure of the economy. The...