In this article we propose a new methodology for computing the aggregate productivity of an industry, its variations and decompositions of the latter into changes of individual productivities (within effect) and changes in industry composition (between effect). Current aggregate measures rely on...

We propose an aggregate growth index that explicitly accounts for non-normality in the micro-economic distribution of firm growth rates and for the presence of a negative scaling relation between their volatility and the size of the firm. Using Compustat data on US publicly traded company, we...

Recently, Marengo and Settepanella (2010) introduced a model of social choice among bundles of interdependent elements. In this paper we prove that their voting model is highly decidable, i.e. a group of agents that agrees to use such voting process has an high probability to reach a final...

In [MP08] L. Marengo and C. Pasquali present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained. In this paper we extend and generalize this approach by providing a geometric model of...

Suppose R is the complement of an essential arrangement of toric hyperlanes in the complex torus (C*)n and pi = pi1(R). We show that H*(R; A) vanishes except in the top degree n when A is one of the following systems of local coefficients: (a) a system of nonresonant coefficients in a complex...

A toric arrangement is a finite set of hypersurfaces in a complex torus, every hypersurface being the kernel of a character. In the present paper we build a CW-complex S homotopy equivalent to the arrangement complement Rx, with a combinatorial description similar to that of the well-known...

Marengo and the second author have developed in the last years a geometric model of social choice when this takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, showing that by bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority has the power of determining the social...

We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of...

In this paper we develop on a geometric model of social choice among bundles of interdependent elements (objects). Social choice can be seen as a process of search for optima in a complex multi-dimensional space and objects determine a decomposition of such a space into subspaces. We present a...

Let Fi h(k, n) be the ith ordered configuration space of all distinct points H1, . . . ,Hh in the Grassmannian Gr(k, n) of k-dimensional sub-spaces of Cn, whose sum is a subspace of dimension i. We prove that Fi h(k, n) is (when non empty) a complex submanifold of Gr(k, n)h of dimension i(n - i)...