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These notes examine the problem of how to extend envelope theorems to infinite-horizon dynamic mechanism design settings, with an application to the design of bandit auctions.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282877
We examine the design of incentive-compatible screening mechanisms for dynamic environments in which the agents' types follow a (possibly non-Markov) stochastic process, decisions may be made over time and may affect the type process, and payoffs need not be time-separable. We derive a formula...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282878
These notes examine the problem of how to extend envelope theorems to infinite-horizon dynamic mechanism design settings, with an application to the design of bandit auctions.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282895
Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots, delivery routes and furniture. Because of complimentarities (or substitution effects) between the different assets, bidders have preferences not just for particular items but for sets or bundles of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236108
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We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599549
Government procurement and allocation programs often use subsidies and setasides favoring small businesses and other target groups to address fairness concerns. These concerns are in addition to standard objectives such as efficiency and revenue. We study the design of the optimal mechanism for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282890