This paper studies the issue of designing an optimal organizational form: design for sub-units' task allocation, decision-making structure, and incentive schemes for organizational members. Depending on the way tasks are allocated between the sub-units, and whether decision-making is centralized...

Empirically, compensation systems generate substantial effort despite weak monetary incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-agent problem and show that reciprocal motivations and explicit performance-based...

An organization is a collection of agents that interact and produce some form of output. Formal organizations - such as corporations and governments - are typically constructed for an explicit purpose though this purpose needn’t be shared by all organizational members. An entrepreneur who...

This paper presents a critical overview of some recent attempts at building formal models of organizations as information-processing and problem-solving entities. We distinguish between two classes of models according to the different objects of analysis. The first class includes models mainly...

Aufbauend auf der These einer zunehmenden Vermarktlichung von Beschäftigungsverhältnissen und des Endes der Organisationsgesellschaft von Davis (2009a, 2009b) untersuchen wir den Wandel der Industrienation Deutschland zur Dienstleistungs- und Wissensgesellschaft und fragen, ob mit diesem...

Die Trends und Veränderungen in der Logistik führen zu einem dezentralen Ansatz der Steuerungssysteme, um die Komplexität logistischer Systeme zu reduzieren. Softwareagenten, insbesondere BDI-Agenten (Belief-Desire-Intention), als Gegenstand dieser Arbeit, bieten aufgrund ihrer Eigenschaften...