We use elementary game-theoretical concepts to compare domestic equilibria with and without marriage. In particular, we examine the effects of marriage legislation, matrimonial property regime, and divorce court sentencing practice, on the decision to marry, and on the choice of game conditional...

We study a partnership that anticipates its possible dissolution. In our model, partnerships form in order to take advantage of complementary skills; although new opportunities may arise that make partners? skills useless. We characterize the optimal, incentive-compatible partnership contract...

Same-sex couples' marital surplus, their excess total income over that predicted by their work times and predicted wages, increases little as the duration of their relationship lengthens. When/where same-sex marriage is legal, it rises sharply as duration increases. The availability of legal...

This paper examines the effects of reforms that reduced alimony on matching in the marriage market. Recent literature indicates that divorce law changes which reduce commitment or income-sharing upon separation will lead to an increase in assortative matching, as women forgo specialization which...

In diesem Beitrag diskutieren wir den in der Literatur heftig umstrittenen Aspekt, ob Vertrauen (Institutionen) nur ein Komplement zu formellen Institutionen (Vertrauen) sein oder diese(s) möglicherweise sogar substituieren kann (können). Wir fassen Vertrauen als spezifische, kooperative...

Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to be a remedy, but gives scope for another kind of opportunistic behavior which we call litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party...

In this paper we analyze whether trust can overcome the contractual hazards caused by the territoriality of law, how effective trust is and what the impact is on the sequential structure of trade. The paper contributes to the New Institutional Economics of International Transactions (NIEIT).