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Venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information in an uncertain environment. All kinds of agency problems are present: moral hazard, adverse selection, hold-up problems, window dressing, etc. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists enter into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297726
which the regulator uses information gleaned from past cost observations when designing the current period's contract. Cost …. However, the design of the regulatory contract affects how much information is gleaned. When learning more about the firm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024728
Many facts are learned through the intermediation of individuals with special access to information, such as law enforcement officers, employees with a security clearance, or experts with specific knowledge. This paper considers whether societies can learn about such facts when information is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011882627
Consider a contract between two players, describing the payment an agent obtains from the principal, in exchange for a … good or service supplied. At each point in time, either player may unilaterally demand a renegotiation of the contract …, involving renegotiation costs for both players. Players’ payoffs from trade under the contract, as well as from a renegotiated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284487
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422168
When economic agents decide their optimal environmental behavior, they have to take into account non continuos evolutionary trends and irreversible changes characterising environmental phenomena. Given the still non perfect biophysical and economic knowledge, decisions have to be taken in an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608543
uncertainty, and we illustrate the contract design in an application with Bayesian learning. The disagreement creates gains from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010283310
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261760
. In particular, when shifting the focus from standard risk aversion to loss aversion, the optimal contract is a simple … bonus contract, i.e. when the agent's performance exceeds a certain threshold he receives a fixed bonus payment. Moreover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264926
We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261310