Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning...

This paper analyzes the allocation of the total toll collected in a highway among its segments. Based on different toll charging rules, we propose the Segments Equal Sharing method, the Exits Equal Sharing method, and the Entrances Equal Sharing method. We provide axioms and characterize these...

Cooperative games with a permission structure are useful tools for analyzing the impact of hierarchical structures on allocation problems in Economics and Operations Research. In this paper, we propose a generalization of the local disjunctive and the local conjunctive permission approaches...

We compute confidence intervals for recursive impact factors, that take into account that some citations are more prestigious than others, as well as for the associated ranks of journals, applying the methods to the population of economics journals. The Quarterly Journal of Economics is clearly...

We propose the river pollution claims problem to distribute a limited pollution budget among agents located along a river. A key distinction with the standard claims problem is that agents are ordered and they are given priority based on their location in this order instead of their identity. We...

We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the...

In economic environments, decision-makers may strategically delay irreversible investments to learn from the actions of others creating socially suboptimal outcomes. We investigate if and how communication mitigates the strategic delay in investment timings. Players choose when to invest in a...

We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-basedWinter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that...

We experimentally compare a simplified version of two mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an (ex ante) equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: one proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, H-MC) and the other by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, PC-W). While H-MC...