The aim of this paper is to propose a methodology to estimate loss given default (LGD) and apply it to a set of micro-data of loans to SME and corporations of an anonymous commercial bank from Central Europe. LGD estimates are important inputs in the pricing of credit risk and the measurement of...

This article presents the results of stress tests of the Czech banking sector conducted using models of credit risk and credit growth broken down by sector. The use of these models enables the stress tests to be linked to the CNB's official quarterly macroeconomic forecast. In addition, the...

The goal of the Basle II regulatory formula is to model the unexpected loss on a loan portfolio. The regulatory formula is based on an asymptotic portfolio unexpected default rate estimation that is multiplied by an estimate of the loss given default parameter. This simplification leads to a...

We integrate Basel II (and III) regulations into the industrial organization approach to banking and analyze the interaction between capital adequacy regulation and credit risk transfer with credit default swaps (CDS) including its effect on lending behavior and risk sensitivity of a...

Instruments for credit risk transfer arise endogenously from and interact with optimizing behavior of their users. This is particularly true with credit derivatives which are usually OTC contracts between banks as buyers and sellers of credit risk. Recent literature, however, does not account...

This study investigates the underlying reasons for banks' continued support of fossil fuel-based firms and examines the role of public guaranteed loans (PGLs) in redirecting resources towards greener economic activities, thereby facilitating the climate transition process. Using a unique...

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the main drivers of the change in the credit risk provisions at a portfolio level for the banks that have been subject of the 2018 EBA stress tests. Therefore, we perform a holistic review of the drivers of the three-year projections of credit losses....

SUERF – The European Money and Finance Forum, the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS) took the opportunity of the first anniversary of this new institution to organise a joint conference in Berlin on 8-9 November 2011. The purpose of this event was...

We analyze shareholders' incentives to change the leverage of a firm that has already borrowed substantially. As a result of debt overhang, shareholders have incentives to resist reductions in leverage that make the remaining debt safer. This resistance is present even without any government...

Banks face two different kinds of moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient 'pet' projects and consuming perquisites that yield private benefits). The privately...