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The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation … higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294835
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The economics of credence goods: on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009
determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields … efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation … higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271236
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Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - 2008
This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple exit option contract, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299151
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Dynamic Insurance and Adverse Selection
Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - 2001
We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand Stiglitz model where agents may differ with respect to theaccidental probability and their expenditure levels incase an accident occurs. We investigate the nature of dynamicinsurance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324841
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Delegation and Information Revelation
Gautier, Axel; Paolini, Dimitri - 2002
This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is contractible. We consider an organization that should take two decisions, affected by a common state of the world parameter only known by the agent. We show that, if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263055
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Wage-hours contracts, overtime working and premium pay
Hart, Robert A.; Ma, Yue - 2008
This paper offers a contract-based theory to explain the determination of standard hours, overtime hours and overtime premium pay. We expand on the wage contract literature that emphasises the role of firm-specific human capital and that explores problems of contract efficiency in the face of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269147
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Monopolistic screening under learning by doing
Gärtner, Dennis - 2007
This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315563
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Do managers with limited liability take more risky decisions? An information acquisition model
Malcomson, James M. - 2010
Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-neutral managers may not when … acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275809
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Testing for adverse selection into private medical insurance
Olivella, Pau; Vera-Hernandez, Marcos - 2006
We develop a test for adverse selection and use it to examine private health insurance markets. In contrast to earlier papers that consider a purely private system or a system in which private insurance supplements a public system, we focus our attention on a system where privately funded health...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292988
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Versicherungsbetrug als ökonomisches Problem: Eine vertragstheoretische Analyse
Schiller, Jörg - 2004
Vertragstheorie - ausgewählte Ansatzpunkte zur Betrugsbekämpfung und insbesondere das Problem der Sanktionierung von ertappten …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307648