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Lawyers as agents of the devil in a prisoner's dilemma game: Evidence from long run play
Ashenfelter, Orley; Bloom, David E.; Dahl, Gordon Boyack - 2013
in wage disputes that were settled by final-offer arbitration in New Jersey. The paper also reports briefly on similar … agreeing not to hire lawyers is cheaper and does not appear to alter arbitration outcomes. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293160
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Incentive compability of dual transfer pricing
Carstens, Stefan; Weinem, Michael - 2000
We examine the implementation of efficient decisions about accepting a special order with asymmetric information by means of a dual transfer pricing mechanism based on Ronen and McKinney (1970). The model is designed in a simple fashion, two vertically related divisions within a firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302269
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The Impact of Compulsory Arbitration on Bargaining Behavior: An Experimental Study
Kritikos, Alexander S. - 2005
A series of experiments compares bargaining behavior under three different settings: no arbitration, conventional and … final offer arbitration. Under no arbitration disputes with zero payoffs were around 10%, while the pie was equally split in … less than half of the cases. Under conventional arbitration - where the arbitrator is free in choosing his award - every …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297233
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Arbitration and Mediation: An Economic Perspective
Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco - 2002
This paper deals with the effects that intermediation has on strategic behaviour in negotiations. To this end, we use the tools of game theory to analyse how different institutional settings can provide specific strategic incentives and thereby condition the outcome of negotiations. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262705
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In support of the supporters? : Do social forces shape decisions of the impartial?
Dohmen, Thomas J. - 2003
Analyzing the neutrality of referees during nine German premier league (1. Bundesliga) soccer seasons, this paper documents evidence that social forces influence agents' preferences and decisions. Those, who are appointed to be impartial, tend to favor the home team as they systematically award...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262713
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Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority
Englmaier, Florian; Filipi, Ales; Singh, Ravi - 2010
We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensationbased and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333720
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Screening, Competition, and Job Design Economic Origins of Good Jobs
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333812
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Overconfidence and Managers' Responsibility Hoarding
Nieken, Petra; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Zhou, Nannan - 2011
Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral phenomenon that involves an overestimation of own capabilities. We introduce a model, in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A rational manager tends to delegate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334132
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Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2010
In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600906
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Disobedience and Authority
Marino, Anthony M.; Matsusaka, John G.; Zabojnik, Jan - 2006
This paper presents a theory of the allocation of authority in an organization in which centralization is limited by the agent's ability to disobey the principal. We show that workers are given more authority when they are costly to replace or do not mind looking for another job, even if they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011940723