We develop a simple two period model to study the importance of motivational differences among politicians in … describing the role of elections and explaining policy choices. In our model, politicians differ in their motives of running … public office. Good politicians care about policies while bad politicians care about rent extraction. Voters want to control …

At the start of their term, politicians often announce which issue they intend to address. To shed light on this agenda … addressing an issue means that the status quo is maintained. Politicians differ in their ability to make correct decisions. They … that politicians and voters have different priors concerning the desirability of a major reform. We show that electoral …

candidate wins the election. …

. Our research design relies on a novel randomized field experiment in collaboration with the leading Italian fact …-checking company. Our results show that politicians are responsive to negative fact-checking. Specifically, we observe a significative … reduction in the number of incorrect statements made by politicians after being treated. This effect persists for at least two …

survey experiment among Dutch politicians, we find that politicians conform their expressed opinion about policy experiments … neither are politicians when we tell them that voters are not. …

experimentation and particularly so when they do not hold a strong opinion about the policy. In a subsequent survey experiment among a … selected group of Dutch politicians, we find that politicians conform their expressed opinion about policy experiments to what …

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care … politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave … politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences. …

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care … politicians? incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians? pay and with polarization of policy preferences …. Moreover, politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave …