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Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
Kunimoto, Takashi; Serrano, Roberto - 2016
rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash … implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set …-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011669323
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The theory of implementation of social choice rules
Serrano, Roberto - 2003
agents in society. The implementation problem is then formulated: under what circumstances can one design a mechanism so that …. The theory of implementation or mechanism design formalizes this “social engineering” problem and provides answers to the … question just posed. I survey the theory of implementation in this article, emphasizing the results based on two behavioral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318948
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Strategic pricing of financial options
Bieta, Volker; Broll, Udo; Milde, Hellmuth; Siebel, Wilfried - 2009
The mainstream model of option pricing is based on an exogenously given process of price movements. The implication of this assumption is that price movements are not affected by actions of market participants. However, if we assume that there are indeed impacts on the price movements it no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010301361
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Thegeneralized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - 2005
We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ?early? and a group of players who choose ?late?. Only the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261378
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Sharp identification regions in games
Beresteanu, Arie; Molchanov, Ilya; Molinari, Francesca - 2008
be extended to other solution concepts, such as for example correlated equilibrium or rationality and rationalizability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288446
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An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution
Trockel, Walter - 2009
is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272572
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On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
Haake, Claus-Jochen; Trockel, Walter - 2007
Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272596
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Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
Mizukami, Hideki; Wakayama, Takuma - 2006
We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first showthat in general … implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy …-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332280
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Trade retaliation in a monetary-trade model
Whalley, John; Yu, Jun; Zhang, Shunming - 2009
We explore how outcomes of trade policy retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via financial intermediation. In such models deficits and surpluses in goods trade are endogenously determined, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264539
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Ambiguous act equilibria
Bade, Sophie - 2010
A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is used to study the e ect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of 'independent strategies' as well as of 'common priors' are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270432