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On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse

van der Linden, Bruno; Lehmann, Etienne - 2004

This paper revisits the normative properties of search-matching economies when homogeneous workers have concave utility functions and wages are bargained over. The optimal allocation of resources is characterized first when information is perfect and second when search effort is not observable....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276945

Producer protection legislation and termination damages in the presence of contracting frictions

Wu, Steven Y. - 2009

This study models producer protection legislation that would grant growers the right to claim damages (PPLD) if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277255

How to deal with covert child labour, and give children an effective education, in a poor developing country

Cigno, Alessandro - 2011

As credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level (if positive), and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278558

Double-sided moral hazard in job displacement insurance contracts

Parsons, Donald O. - 2011

Job displacement insurance typically includes both unemployment benefits and lump-sum severance pay, and each has provoked policy concerns. Unemployment insurance concerns have centered on distorted job search/offer acceptance decisions by the worker, severance-induced firing cost concerns on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280678

The fetters of the sib: Weber meets Darwin

Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2007

We analyze the effects of family ties on the incentives for productive effort. A family is modelled as a pair of altruistic siblings. Each sibling exerts effort to produce output under uncertainty and siblings may transfer output to each other. We show that altruism has a non-monotonic effect on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281251

A median voter model of health insurance with ex post moral hazard

Jacob, Johanna; Lundin, Douglas - 2000

One of the main features of health insurance is moral hazard, as defined by Pauly (1968); people face incentives for excess utilization of medical care since they do not pay the full marginal cost for provision. To mitigate the moral hazard problem, a coinsurance can be included in the insurance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281371

Altruism and climate

Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2006

Recognizing that individualism, or weak family ties, may be favorable to economic development, we ask how family ties interact with climate to determine individual behavior and whether there is reason to believe that the strength of family ties evolves differently in different climates. For this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281418

Family ties, incentives and development: A model of coerced altruism

Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2007

We analyze the effects of family ties on the incentives for production of effort, where family ties are defined as a mixture of true and coerced altruism between family members. We model families as pairs of siblings. Each sibling exerts effort in order to obtain output under uncertainty. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281420

Procrastination in teams, contract design and discrimination

Weinschenk, Philipp - 2011

We study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that the players begin to invest effort only shortly before the time limit when the reward for solving the task is shared equally. We explore how the team can design contracts to mitigate this form of procrastination and show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286688

Securitization and moral hazard: Evidence from credit score cutoff rules

Bubb, Ryan; Kaufman, Alex - 2011

research has hypothesized that these cutoff rules result from a securitization rule of thumb. Under this theory, an observed … model that rationalizes such an origination rule of thumb. Under this alternative theory, jumps in default are not evidence … securitization rule-of-thumb theory but consistent with the origination rule-of-thumb theory. There are jumps in the number of loans …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286944