This paper is an experimental analysis of the role played by workers? expectations in explaining the puzzling long-run persistence of observed discrimination against certain minorities in the labor market. The experiment provides some evidence supporting the theoretical prediction that unequal...

Often, the moment of a treatment and the moment at which the outcome of interest occurs are realizations of stochastic processes with dependent unobserved determinants. Notably, both treatment and outcome are characterized by the moment they occur. In this paper, we compare different methods of...

We examine the macroeconomic consequences of industry wage bargaining and product market reforms. We suggest that general equilibrium effects may be important for the evaluation of industry-specific regulations. In particular, we suggest that the European unemployment problem can be traced back...

This paper studies the role of labor market institutions on unemployment and on the cyclical properties of job flows. We construct an intertemporal general equilibrium model with search unemployment and endogenous job turnover, and examine the consequences of introducing an unemployment benefit,...

Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) show that a detailed decomposition of the coefficients effect is destined to suffer from an identification problem since the detailed coefficients effect attributed to a dummy variable is not invariant to the choice of reference groups. It turns out that the...

This article considers a wide class of censoring problems and presents a construction rule for an objective function. This objective function generalises the ordinary likelihood as well as particular ?likelihoods? used for estimation in several censoring models. Under regularity conditions the...

We study employment, employee effort, wages and profit sharing when firms face stochastic revenue shocks and when base wages and profit shares are determined through negotiations. The negotiated profit share depends positively on the relative bargaining power of the trade union and it has...

By enriching a principal-agent model it is shown that the introduction of monetary incentives may reduce an agent?s motivation. In a first step, we allow for the possibility that some agents stick to unverifiable agreements. The larger the fraction of reliable agents, the lower powered will then...

This paper reviews Jacob Mincer?s contributions to the analyses of earnings and the distribution of earnings through his pioneering focus on labor market experience or on-the-job training. It begins with a brief discussion of the theoretical literature on the distribution of earnings in the...

In this article, a modelling framework for the information transmission between agents in an evolutionary game setting is proposed. Agents observe traits which reflect past and present behaviour and success of other agents. If agents imitate more successful agents based on these traits, the...