Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$...

We study two-player discounted repeated games in which one player cannot monitor the other unless he pays a fixed amount. It is well known that in such a model the folk theorem holds when the monitoring cost is on the order of magnitude of the stage payoff. We analyze high frequency games in...

Real world players often increase their payoþs by voluntarily committing to play a .xed strategy, prior to the start of a strategic game. In fact, the players may further bene.t from commitments that are conditional on the commitments of others. This paper proposes a model of conditional...

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a simple criterion enabling to conclude that two agents do not share a common prior. The criterion is simple, as it does not require information about the agents' knowledge and beliefs, but rather only the record of a dialogue between the agents. In...

Two players are about to play a discounted infinitely repeated bimatrix game. Each player knows his own payoff matrix and chooses a strategy which is a best response to some private beliefs over strategies chosen by his opponent. If both players' beliefs contain a grain of truth (each assigns...

Global games are real-valued functions defined on partitions (rather than subsets) of the set of players. They capture "public good" aspects of cooperation, i.e. situations where the payoff is naturally defined for all players ("the globe") together, as is the cause with issues of environmental...