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Study on the collusive corruption in supervision of bank credit

Nan, Xu-guang; Kao, Meng-chun - In: Journal of applied finance & banking 2 (2012) 1, pp. 93-103

Commercial banks are typical hierarchical organizations, in which the multipleprincipal-agent problem exists and induces serious internal collusive corruption. This article analyzes the collusive corruption between credit supervisors and credit managers in bank credit activities, through three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010009110

Disclosure of medical information in health insurance

Rahkovsky, Ilya - In: Advances in management & applied economics 3 (2013) 1, pp. 183-205

Disclosure of private medical information allows insurance companies to better predict medical expenditures. The premiums the companies charge the insured employees reflect these expenditures. This paper studies incentives of employees to disclose their medical information. I find that healthier...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010097676

Endogenous governance transparency and product market competition

Hidalgo-Cabrillana, Ana - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 4 (2013) 1, pp. 113-136

This paper analyzes the determinants of governance transparency. In our model, entrepreneurs optimally decide the precision of their earning reporting by trading off the possibility of expropriating profits against the capacity to attract external funding.We find that information is only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010148154

Information sharing and lending market competition under strong adverse selection

Fernández-Ruiz, Jorge; García-Cestona, Miguel - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 4 (2013) 2, pp. 235-245

In a relatively recent paper, Gehrig and Stenbacka (Eur Econ Rev 51, 77–99, 2007) show that information sharing increases banks’ profits to the detriment of creditworthy entrepreneurs in a model of a banking duopoly with switching costs and poaching. They restrict their analysis to the case...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010148159

Gütesiegel : zu detaillierte Angaben können die Funktionsfähigkeit der Zertifikate schmälern

Pollrich, Martin; Wagner, Lilo - In: DIW-Wochenbericht : Wirtschaft, Politik, Wissenschaft 80 (2013) 19, pp. 15-18

Nach einer Serie von Lebensmittelskandalen ist das Vertrauen der Verbraucher in die Industrie erschüttert. Kritik schlägt dabei nicht nur den Herstellern selbst, sondern auch den Anbietern von Gütesiegeln entgegen, die Produkte leichtfertig zertifiziert haben. Die Rufe nach gesteigerter...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010148248

Do dividend policies signal corporate operating characteristics?

Raei, Reza; Moradi, Mahammad; Eskandar, Hoda - In: Journal of applied finance & banking 2 (2012) 4, pp. 13-24

, the focus is on empirical test of signaling theory. This theory says that the payment of dividends provides information … dividend and earning. It means that dividend has information content about return and earning and so, signaling theory was …, signaling theory was not approved. In addition to, there was a significantly positive relationship between dividend and size. It …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010058681