The question of why some countries suffer from crises, while some others can escape from them, is challenging. Empirical evidence suggests that countries with stronger financial institutions are more durable to the wind of crises. In this paper, we investigate empirically whether the link...

We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and the supervision of domestic banks. The regulator faces a trade-off: high capital requirements cause a drop in the banks’ profitability, whereas strict supervision reduces the scope of...

We investigate the effect that exchange rate regimes have on the degree of central bank involvement in banking supervision. Using both de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes, we find that, conditional on several other factors affecting supervisory power allocation, policymakers are more...

In the light of the recent financial market turmoil, this paper focuses on liquidity risk management from the point of view of both supervisory authorities and large financial institutions. This research aims at pointing out the main differences between national regulations and supervisory...

A healthy and stable banking system resilient to financial crises is a prerequisite for sustainable growth. Minimization of a) the associated systemic risk and b) of the contagion effect in a banking crisis is a necessary condition to achieve this goal. The Central Bank is in charge of this...

Banking union is the most ambitious European project undertaken since the introduction of the single currency. It was launched in the summer of 2012, in order to send the markets a strong signal of unity against a looming financial fragmentation problem that was putting the euro on the ropes....

This paper adds some new arguments to the thesis that the responsibility for banking supervision should be assigned to an agency formally separated by the Central bank. We also provide some additional evidence on the macro and microeconomic performance of OECD countries whose banking systems are...

This paper focuses on the issue of the information asymmetry between <p> the Federal Reserve Bank and commercial forecasters. Previous theoretical and <p> empirical evidence suggests that in the absence of confidential supervisory <p> information, commercial forecasters either under- or over- predict...</p></p></p>