about these welfare gains is not logically licensed. In short, labeling punishment “altruistic” because it has the effect of … punishment can help solve collective action problems. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013 …

punishment behavior. (3) Thereare discontinuous “jumps” in the behavior of responders. They either chooseno punishment (destroy … nothing) or the highest level of punishment (destroyeverything). (4) Expectations have a significant effect on the … probabilityof punishment but not on the intensity of experienced emotion. We explainthis last result in terms of norm …

punishment for an unkind action. It also studies how fairness perceptions affect the reaction to punishment and whether this …

; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval, punishment. Our findings are that, for a given pattern of contributions …, neither punishment nor emotion depends on the Give versus Take framing that we manipulate. To this extent, they suggest that …

decision procedure (hot versus cold), we varied the second mover punishment costs (high versus low). Significant impacts of … movers. We observed, however, no decrease in reward and an increase in punishment. The hot cold variable only informs first …

This experimental study investigates how behavior changes after punishment for an unkind action. It also studies how … fairness perceptions affect the reaction to punishment and whether this effect is consistent across repeated play and role …

) Irritation and contempt drive punishment behavior. (3) There are discontinuous “jumps” in the behavior of responders. They either … choose no punishment (destroy nothing) or the highest level of punishment (destroy everything). (4) Expectations have a … significant effect on the probability of punishment but not on the intensity of experienced emotion. We explain this last result …

This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide … punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels … because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment …

; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval, punishment. Our findings are that, for a given pattern of contributions …, neither punishment nor emotion depends on the Give versus Take framing that we manipulate. To this extent, they suggest that …