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Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers

Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Ménard, … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However …, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract as the … optimal contract that integrates unemployment insurance and retirement pension systems. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822369

Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Quantitative Implications for Unemployment Insurance

Fuller, David L. - Department of Economics, Concordia University - 2010

I construct a dynamic contracting model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard that captures the transition from unemployment to non-participation observed in the data, which the standard moral hazard model fails to capture. My model generates both qualitative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533896

An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2002

We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762054

JOB SEARCH COSTS AND INCENTIVES

Zapechelnyuk, Andriy; Ro'i Zultan - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2013

The costs of searching for a job vacancy are typically associated with fric- tion that deters or delays employment of potentially productive individuals. We demonstrate that in a labor market with moral hazard where effort is non- contractible, job search costs play a positive role, whose effect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272231

Should UI Benefits Really Fall Over Time?

Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José V. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2002

The issue of whether unemployment benefits should increase or decrease over the unemployment spell is analyzed in a tractable model allowing moral hazard, adverse selection and hidden saving. Analytical results show that when the search productivity of unemployed is constant over the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761875

Unemployment Insurance and Precautionary Savings : Transitional Dynamics vs. Steady State Equilibrium

Gilles, JOSEPH; Thomas, WEITZENBLUM - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001

In this study, we ask whether the presence of precautionary savings substantially reduces the optimal replacement rate in an economy characterized by equilibrium unemployment and moral hazard. In line with previous studies, the optimality criterion based on comparisons of steady states leads to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005132860

Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs

Pavoni, Nicola; Violante, Giovanni L - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

A Welfare-to-Work (WTW) program is a mix of government expenditures on various labor market policies targeted to the unemployed (e.g., unemployment insurance, job search monitoring, social assistance, wage subsidies). This paper provides a dynamic principal-agent framework suitable for analyzing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661766

Do Low-Wage Workers React Less to Longer Unemployment Benefits? Quasi-Experimental Evidence

Centeno, Mario; Novo, Alvaro A. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

The fact that unemployed workers have different abilities to smooth consumption entails heterogeneous responses to extended unemployment benefits. Our empirical exercise explores a quasi-experimental setting generated by an increase in the benefits entitlement period. The results point towards a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990913

Design of the WPRS System and Evaluation in Michigan

Eberts, Randall W.; O'Leary, Christopher J. - W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850021

Data Analysis of the Implementation of the Recovery Act: Workforce Development and Unemployment Insurance Provisions

Eberts, Randal W.; Wandner, Stephen A. - W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850064

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