We investigate the terms of exchange between the legislative branch of the government and an administrative bureau with standard operating procedures. An administrative bureau is a not-for-profit public organisation responsible for the production of a non-marketable good. Such a bureau is...

Within a standard three-tier regulatory model, a benevolent prin- cipal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the …rms (two-type) costs and the arrangement of a pricing mecha- nism. The agency may have an incentive to manipulate information to the principal to share the...

This paper reviews the theories of corruption in regulated sectors to further understand the impact of corruption and the ways in which it can be reduced. The aim is to draw out the policy implications of the different theoretical approaches and to examine the support that can be garnered for...

We investigate regulation as the outcome of a bargaining process between a regulator and a regulated firm. The regulator is required to monitor the firm’s costs and reveal its information to a political principal (Congress). In this setting, we explore the scope for collusion between the...

We consider the regulation of a monopolistic market when the prin- cipal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the firm's unknown costs and the arrangement of a pricing mechanism. As usual, the agency may have an incentive to hide information from the principal to share...

“Why workers’ rights are not women’s rights” is an argument whose purpose is to make clear why workers’ rights rest on a masculine embodiment of the labor subject and it is this masculine embodiment which is at the center of employment contracts and employment relations systems. By...

OECD indicators of structural policy show that policy changes in Italy since 1998 should have improved the environment for entrepreneurship significantly, but in the same period its economic performance has deteriorated noticeably. This may be partly because there is a difference between policy...

This paper studies the design of law-making and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure, defined as the socialwelfare loss that results from the regime's inability to...

Reviewing the public and private interest approaches to the regulation in the market for legal services, this article points out their mutual inconsistency and their empirical and theoretical limits. It then argues that heterogeneous legal services should be considered when (de)regulating the...

This paper studies the design of law-making and law enforcement institutions based on the premise that law is inherently incomplete. Under incomplete law, law enforcement by courts may suffer from deterrence failure, defined as the socialwelfare loss that results from the regime's inability to...