This paper’s field evidence is: (1) many official sectors rapidly forget the damage of the 1982-85 exchange rate liquidity crisis and reverted to what caused that crisis, namely a closed economy clean floats perspective; and (2) the 2006-2008/9 exchange rate liquidity shock would have been more...

Our experiment investigates managers’ self-predictions of their subsequent performance and, based upon, their choice of a collaborator. Our results show that managers’ self-predictions are not biased anymore after they are informed about the performance of a reference group. In spite of...

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool...

Holmström’s (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision...

The effects of unproductive lobbying have so far mainly been addressed by the public choice literature on rent-seeking and by Milgrom/Roberts' (1988,1990) work on influence activities in organizations. Our paper makes an attempt to incorporate lobbying into the simple principal-agent framework...

This paper reports an option pricing experiment on the binomial model, which has been conducted with professional traders of financial assets. The experimental results are compared to a corresponding experiment with students. The data show that professional traders achieve lower arbitrage...

Opinion is divided on whether it is better to have a single world   money or variable exchange rates.  Pope, Selten and von Hagen (2003)   propose that fresh light would be shed via an analysis that allows   for seven complexity impacts on the exchange rate that are   underplayed...

This paper experimentally explores group decision-making in a two-player power-to-take game. Discussions preceding group decisions are video taped and analyzed. Each subject first earns an income in an individual effort task preceding the game. The game consists of two stages. First, one group...

The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates as alternative incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability. However, in practice real workers' wealth is typically restricted. Therefore, this paper compares both schemes under the assumption of limited...

In the context of principal-agent theory risk is largely seen as a source that causes inefficiencies and lowers incentives and accordingly is not in the principal’s interest. In this paper I compare two different designs of a collective tournament where output in a team is generated through a...