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A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games
Decker, Torsten; Stiehler, Andreas; Strobel, Martin - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (2003) 6, pp. 751-772
One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution, profit levels, and justice are presented. Influences crucial to participants’ support for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011136132
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Local Control : An Educational Model of Private Enforcement of Public Rules
Kosfeld, M.; Huck, S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1998
We study a society of agents where individual incentives conflict with collective ones and thus individual utility maximization leads to inefficient outcomes. We assume that there is no functioning central institution which can control individual behavior. Instead, we analyze a system of what we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091336
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Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Privileged Groups: The Role of Capability and Valuation on Public Goods Provision
Koelle, Felix - Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and … - 2012
We experimentally investigate cooperation in privileged groups which according to Olson (1965) are groups in which at … opportunities, heterogeneity crucially affects cooperation and coordination within groups. Compared to non-privileged groups …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010562390
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Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups
Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007
In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, their inherent asymmetric nature may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761712
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The Design of (De)centralized Punishment Institutions for Sustaining Co-operation
Kosfeld, Michael; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004
cooperation and sanctioning', 2007, <I>KritV - Kritische Vierteljahresschrift fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft</I>, 90, 1 …, and whether they can increase the cooperation level of individuals in the group. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256917
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Incomplete Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence
Leibbrandt, Andreas; Ramalingam, Abhijit; Saaksvuori, Lauri - School of Economics, University of East Anglia - 2013
Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010890961
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Non-Strategic Punishment when Monitoring is Costly: Experimental Evidence on Differences between Second and Third Party Behavior
Goeschl, Timo; Jarke, Johannes - Alfred-Weber-Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, … - 2013
This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with … endogenous information structures: Players are uninformed whether the target player cooperated or defected at the cooperation … to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895506