The paper extends Nash's theory of two-person bargaining games with fixed threats to bargaining situations with incomplete information. After defining such bargaining situations, a formal bargaining model (bargaining game) will be proposed for them. This bargaining game, regarded as...

The authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the...

People's utility levels are meant to be measures of their well-being. Early utilitarians defined them in terms of people's happiness. Modern economics defines them in terms of people's actual preferences. But in ethics they have to be defined in terms of people's informed preferences. I shall...

John C. Harsanyi's rejoinder to comments and replies to Kadane, J. B., P. D. Larkey. 1982. Subjective probability and the theory of games. Management Sci. 28 (2) 113--120 and Kadane, J. B., P. D. Larkey. 1982. Reply to Professor Harsanyi. Management Sci. 28 (2) 124.

Prize Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 9, 1994.

I was born in Budapest, Hungary, on May 29, 1920. The high school my parents chose for me was the Lutheran Gymnasium in Budapest, one of the best schools in Hungary, with such distinguished alumni as John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner. I was very happy in this school and received a superb...