Shapley value and the core are studied for the general (i.e., unrestricted) case. …

Consider the cooperative coalition games with side payments. Bargaining sets are calculated for all possible coalition …, which is acceptable by all players of the game under grand coalition. Though Shapely value is a single imputation, it is …

The core is reformulated to incorporate the externality typical in strategic form games.  Any coalition of players may … deviate by trying to commit to a profile of actions different from a status quo.  The outsiders of the coalition may take a … coordinated measure, incentive-feasibly for themselves, to preempt the coalition's commitment.  If a coalition succeeds in …

authority among shareholders, because a blocking coalition's resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders …. Based on a notion of stochastic blocking, we extend Anderson's (1978) core convergence theorem to production economies where …

backward induction procedure to pinpoint the latest moment at which a coalition can be found with both an incentive and the … this way will be agreed upon at the outset - or, if a suitable coalition is never found, that no agreement will be reached. …

concepts of the core such that a coalition's blocking plan is feasible only if it is not blocked by the outsiders with such … competitive behaviors as a coalition's attempt to block a status quo given the threat that the outsiders of the coalition …, especially those with whom the coalition shares ownership of firms, may resort to production-ruining secession. We introduce new …