This paper discusses the ways by which a certain type of behavioral deviation from expected utility theory has been handled by psychologists and economists. With respect to the historical background of decision theory in economics, it is argued that there are good reasons for more theoretical...

This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implement social choice functions in the traditional sense. Will the agents actually play the equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study the dynamic implementation of the first-best solution for the so-called King...

This paper explores some of the consequences of adopting a modern subjective view of probability for game theory. The consequences are substantial. The subjective view of probability clarifies the important distinction between normative and positive theorizing about behavior in games, a...

Management Science recently printed an exchange of views between Kadane and Larkey (Kadane, J. B., P. D. Larkey. 1982. Subjective probability and the theory of games. Management Sci. 28 113--120; Kadane, J. B., P. D. Larkey. 1982. Reply to Professor Harsanyi. Management Sci. 28 124.) and Harsanyi...

How do individual agents enact the institutions that govern collective behavior in a social situation? How do individuals come to share self-enforcing expectations about collective behavior, so that societal rules and constraints have an effect on individual choice? Conventional accounts, such...