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Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan
Gwartney, James; Holcombe, Randall - In: Constitutional Political Economy 25 (2014) 3, pp. 265-279
James Buchanan advocated the market mechanism for allocating resources because it is based on voluntary exchange. People engage in market transactions only when they believe they benefit from doing so. Buchanan depicted the political process the same way. People engage in collective activities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010989156
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As the People Want It, Blueprint for a New Confederation
Knutsen, John F - EconWPA - 2004
Presents a complete and detailed constitutional framework applying the rational self-interest model and market mechanisms to intra and inter- governmental behaviour and collective decisions. In particular, the paper presents an enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment and dissolution of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076593
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Tullock challenges: happiness, revolutions, and democracy
Frey, Bruno - In: Public Choice 148 (2011) 3, pp. 269-281
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009327312
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The constitution of economic growth: Testing the prosperity effects of a Madisonian model on a panel of countries 1980‐2000
Justesen, Mogens K.; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
Political scientists and economists increasingly agree that institutions may influence economic growth, but there is little general agreement on what institutions tend to produce what consequences. We apply public choice insights for a theoretical analysis that may be termed “Madisonian”:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421987
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The constitutional dilemma of European integration
Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 1998
The paper analyzes European integration from a constitutional economics perspective. It is argued that the use of the Prisoners' Dilemma as a description of the advantages of European integration is fallacious. If the situation is a PD, the solution is impossible; if it is not, it is unnecessary.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644912
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An enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment, and dissolution of states and governmental units
Hausken, Kjell; Knutsen, John F. - In: Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 4 (2010), pp. 1-38
The article proposes an enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment and dissolution of governmental units, giving autonomy to each individual as in a direct democracy. The mechanism is designed such that Pareto optimality is possible, in contrast to earlier models which make various...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693867
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Remembering Bill Niskanen: pursuing economics as a public science in the service of liberty
Wagner, Richard - In: Public Choice 153 (2012) 1, pp. 1-7
This short essay is a memorial piece about William A. Niskanen (13 March 1933–26 October 2011). The essay starts with his time at the University of Chicago in the mid-1950s, and gives most attention to his contributions to public choice. Especial attention is paid to his Bureaucracy and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010864484
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Why Brennan and Buchanan are wrong (after all)
Apolte, Thomas - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Westfälische … - 2007
In their book The Power to Tax, Brennan and Buchanan have pointed to a central weakness of the traditional theory of … public finance and especially of the theory of optimal taxation: This approach overlooked the problem of governmental power … theory appears to be once the problem of power is considered. Nevertheless, Brennan and Buchanan's suggestions for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008462090
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The Powers of The Central Governments and the Problems of Enlarging and Deepening the European Union: An Essay of Constitutional Political Economy
Faíña-Medín, J.; García-Lorenzo, Antonio; … - In: Constitutional Political Economy 16 (2005) 4, pp. 369-386
In this paper we present an adaptation of Buchanan and Tullock’s model in order to apply it to the constitutional choices regarding the assigning of powers to a supranational authority. The outcome of the economic-political model developed in this paper demonstrates that there are constraints...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005673718
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The Natural Economic Advantage of Dictatorship over Democracy: A “Gresham's Law” of Governance
Azfar, Omar; Mcguire, Martin - In: International Tax and Public Finance 9 (2002) 4, pp. 451-463
We show that when democratic and autocratic governments peacefully compete for governance over the same jurisdiction the autocratic has a natural advantage. The autocratic government, which unambiguously reduces welfare for everyone except the autocrat, will drive the competing democratic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005711513