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Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena
Gersbach, H.; Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1998
novel feature is the competition between lenders in their choice of contracts offered. Qualities of investment projects are … themselves across all offered contracts. Competition of banks introduces three possibilities for a breakdown of credit markets … may make the lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and additional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092395
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Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena
Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
crucial novel feature is the competition between lenders in their choice of contracts offered. The quality of investment … distribute themselves across all offered contracts. Competition between banks introduces three possibilities for a breakdown of … lenders, which may make lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661861
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Managementul omnipotent şi puterea stimulentelor etatiste. Hazard moral în interiorul corporaţiei moderne
Mihaela, Iacob; Octavian-Dragomir, Jora - In: Revista OEconomica (2012) 01
The logic of agency problems is that “legally” the principals are (institutionally) hampered from configuring or securing the contractual precautions they wish to enforce out of those available in a pure free market. We review topics pointing that omnipotent management phenomenon is not a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010965625
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The employment contract when the firm can utilize a free resource
Mustonen, Mikko - In: Journal of Economics 99 (2010) 3, pp. 239-250
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552579
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On the Coexistence of Banks and Markets
Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, … - 2006
investment banks and rating agencies have screening know-how and can alleviate adverse-selection problems. In competition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005677908
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Moral hazard with discrete soft information.
Roger, Guillaume - School of Economics, UNSW Business School - 2011
I study a simple model of moral hazard with soft information. The risk-averse agent takes an action and she alone observes the stochastic outcome; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments, the principal cannot solve these two problems...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010618296
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Optimal contract under moral hazard with soft information.
Roger, Guillaume - School of Economics, UNSW Business School - 2011
optimal transfer is option-like, the contract leaves the agent with some ex ante rent and fails to elicit truthful revelation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010618300
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Tournaments with gaps
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - In: Economics Letters 122 (2014) 2, pp. 211-214
A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents’ performance is measured on a cardinal scale …, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041826
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The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money
Fagart, Marie-Cécile; Fluet, Claude - In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 49 (2013) 1, pp. 7-16
We provide sufficient conditions for the first-order approach in the principal-agent problem when the agent’s utility has the nonseparable form u(y−c(a)) where y is the contractual payoff and c(a) is the money cost of effort. We first consider a decision-maker facing prospects which cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065449
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Moral hazard contracting and credit rationing in opaque credit markets
He, Xin - In: International Journal of Computational Economics and … 5 (2015) 1, pp. 12-34
We make a first step in the literature to analyse a hybrid model of credit rationing with simultaneous presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. Motivated by the observation that credit markets in less-developed countries are rather opaque owing to the lack of necessary institutions to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011207752