Cet Article Traite D'un Probleme D'allocation Statique Dans Lequel une Renegotiation Est Modelisee Comme un Processus Non-Verifiable Qui Modifie les Termes D'un Contrat Entre un Vendeur Non Informe et un Acheteur Informe Apres la Selection Initiale de L'acheteur. Il Demontre Que le Contrat...

The recent work on misallocation argues that aggregate productivity in poor countries is low because various market frictions prevent marginal products from being equalized. By focusing on such allocative inefficiencies, misallocation is construed as a purely static phenomenon. This paper argues...

Do individuals use all information at their disposal when forming expectations about future events? In this paper we present an econometric framework to answer this question. We show how individual information sets can be characterized by simple nonparametric exclusion restrictions and provide a...

There have been dramatic changes in education policy throughout the world in the final quarter of the 20th Century. This important volume presents an invaluable collection of previously published and specially commissioned articles which capture these major changes in educational policy.

A universal systems design process is specified, tested in a case study and evaluated. It links English narratives to numbers using a categorical language framework with mathematical mappings taking the place of conjunctions and numbers. The framework is a ring of English narrative words between...

This paper explores two models of an economy in which contracts are exchanged. In the first model, contracts are exchanged on a competitive market in which traders' expectations concerning conditions that prevail within specific markets adjust until markets 'clear.' In the second model, contract...

In this paper, a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an infinite number of buyers and sellers, all of whom differ according to their valuation for the single indivisible object being traded. A competitive distribution of auctions is such that no seller...