We analyze survey data from Mississippi coastal communities where Katrina made its final landfall. Logistic regressions indicate that government aid is helpful in dealing with one- to two-month economic disruption and long-term rebuilding but is less helpful with regard to short-term rebuilding...

Nonconvexities undermine the efficiency of the usually robust "double auction" or DA market institution. We experimentally examine two modified DAs that allow for particularly rich bilateral contracting such as arbitrarily nonlinear pricing. The first allows for arbitrarily nonlinear pricing but...

We examine transitions between excise tax and license fee regimes in the laboratory. The regimes have matched equilibrium Marshallian surplus, but license fees generate more tax revenue. The license fees are large “avoidable costs,” known to hamper competitive equilibrium convergence. With...

We conduct an experimental analysis of final offer arbitration (FOA) with differentially informed players. Under FOA, the arbitrator must choose one of the two submitted offers. In our control, the uninformed player makes an offer to the informed player prior to the submission of offers to the...

We conduct an experimental analysis of bargaining under asymmetric information, where the dispute resolution mechanism can be interpreted as either a civil trial or conventional arbitration. In our treatment, we allow for credible and costless transmission of private information. Consistent with...

We use numerical methods to compute Nash equilibrium (NE) bid functions for four agents bidding in a first-price auction. Each bidder i is randomly assigned: ri ɛ [0, rmax], where 1 − ri is the Arrow-Pratt measure of constant relative risk aversion. Each ri is independently drawn from...