We consider the following stage game: a domestic government chooses an import quota, the a domestic and a foreign firm choose their quality level before engaging a price competition. We first show that the indirect effect of the quota on the sales of the domestic producer are different depending...

We consider the following stage game : A domestic government chooses an import quota, then a domestic and a foreign firm choose their quality level before engaging a price competition in the final stage. We first show that the indirect effect of the quota on the sales of the domestic producer...

In this paper, we consider a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation. Firms choose simultanously the quality of the product they sell and then compete in prices simultaneously. We offer the complete characterization of quality choices for this model and thereby give a precise content...

In this paper, the authors consider a European industry characterized by vertical product differentiation. Using a two-stages model with quality choice made before price competition takes place, the authors show that EU antidumping policy that takes the form of price-undertaking offers a...

We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of horizontal product differentiation. We characterise the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna. We show that a foreign producer would choose a...

We consider the two-stage game proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman in the adress model of horizontal differenciation developed by Hotelling. Firms choose capacities in the first stage and then compete in price. We show that capacity precommitment softens price competitio drastically.