For strategic communication games à la Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50:1431–1451, <CitationRef CitationID="CR3">1982</CitationRef>) the paper shows that under some prior beliefs different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same...</citationref>

The paper surveys theoretical models of job mobility with special attention to promotion and career profiles. The review is ordered according to the assumptions concerning information on workers' relevant characteristics (i.e. perfect vs. imperfect information, private vs. public information)...

The survey is focused on the typical problems in information transmission from experts to non-experts. Attention is paid to the factors that can affect information disclosure in models that apply a game-theoretic approach to the use of professional advice. In the economic literature expertise is...

The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be different equilibrium...

The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to non-experts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information between the expert, who is the better informed agent,...