This volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction of the adaptive strategy called <i>regret-matching</i>, which on the one hand is simple and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to...

AbstractWe exhibit a large class of simple rules of behavior, which we call adaptive heuristics, and show that they generate rational behavior in the long run. These adaptive heuristics are based on natural regret measures, and may be viewed as a bridge between rational and behavioral...

AbstractHart and Mas-Colell (2000) show that if all players play “regret matching” strategies, i.e., they play with probabilities proportional to the regrets, then the empirical distribution of play converges to the set of correlated equilibria, and the regrets of every player converge to...

AbstractWe study the question of how long it takes players to reach a Nash equilibrium in uncoupled setups, where each player initially knows only his own payoff function. We derive lower bounds on the communication complexity of reaching a Nash equilibrium, i.e., on the number of bits that need...

AbstractJohn F. Nash, Jr., submitted his Ph. D. dissertation entitled Non-Cooperative Games to Princeton University in 1950. Read it 58 years later, and you will find the germs of various later developments in game theory. Some of these are presented below, followed by a discussion of dynamic...

AbstractAn elementary proof, based on linear duality, is provided for the existence of correlated equilibria in finite games. The existence result is then extended to infinite games, including some that possess no Nash equilibria.

AbstractWe study the problem of reaching a pure Nash equilibrium in multi-person games that are repeatedly played under the assumption of uncoupledness: every player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by finite-state automata, and characterize the...

Politik hat vielfach zum Ziel, das Verhalten von Wirtschaftssubjekten durch eine Veränderung der Rahmenbedingungen zu steuern. Bei der Politikfolgenabschätzung müssen deshalb Voraussagen gemacht werden, wie Menschen sich an veränderte ökonomische Bedingungen anpassen. Eine wichtige...

We consider a supply chain with a single supplier and two retailers. The retailers choose their orders strategically, and if their orders exceed the supplier's capacity, quantities are allocated proportionally to the orders. We experimentally study the capacity allocation game using subjects...

A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose...