Fixed point theorems are the standard tool used to prove the existence of equilibria in mathematical economics. This paper shows how to prove a slight generalization of Brouwer's and Kakutani's fixed point theorems using the familiar techniques of drawing and shifting curves in the plane and is,...

The paper aims at a conceptual contribution to the normative economic analysis of rural de-velopment (RD) policies. RD is regarded as a problem of interaction between individuals; (lacking) structural change or the (missing) integration of externalities are therefore recon-structed as...

Der Preisanpassungsprozess im Oligopol wird untersucht. Unter recht allgemeinen Voraussetzungen an die (lineare) Preis-Nachfrage-Funktionen der Akteure werden verschiedene Strategien diskutiert, wie z. B. die klassische Cournot-Nash-Lösung, die Launhardt-Hotelling-Strategie, die Stackelbergsche...

We study a Hotelling’s duopoly in world cotton market to examine the effects of Precision Agriculture’s (PA) adoption in term of strategic international trade between the United-States and Central and West Africa (CWA). We prove that US producers should be well advised to adopt PA to offer...

We analyze welfare maximizing monetary policy in a dynamic two-country model with price stickiness and imperfect competition. In this context, a typical terms of trade externality affects policy interaction between independent monetary authorities. Unlike the existing literature, we remain...

In their model of network formation, Berninghaus et al. (Exp Econ 9:237–251, <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">2006</CitationRef>; J Evol Econ 17:317–347, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">2007</CitationRef>) showed that a periphery-sponsored star network is a strict Nash equilibrium. To examine the validity of their result, they also performed a laboratory experiment with human...</citationref></citationref>

This article analyses the ability of the learning firms in a Cournot oligopoly to discover market solutions more collusive that the Cournot equilibrium (CE). We start from the results of Vallée and Yıldızoğlu (J Econ Behav Organ 72:670–690, <CitationRef CitationID="CR11">2009</CitationRef>) and of Alós-Ferrer (Int J Ind Organ...</citationref>

We use a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study the impacts of an exogenous fall in aggregate demand, the resulting increase in public debt, and the consequences of a sovereign debt haircut for a member country or bloc of the union. Two different scenarios for such a haircut...