We consider the two-stage game proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman in the adress model of horizontal differenciation developed by Hotelling. Firms choose capacities in the first stage and then compete in price. We show that capacity precommitment softens price competitio drastically.

Both product differentiation through quality and capacity commitment have been shown to relax price competition. However, they have not been considered simultaneously. To this end we consider a three stage game where firms choose quality then commit to capacity and finally compete in price.

We consider the following stage game : A domestic government chooses an import quota, then a domestic and a foreign firm choose their quality level before engaging a price competition in the final stage. We first show that the indirect effect of the quota on the sales of the domestic producer...

We consider the following stage game: a domestic government chooses an import quota, the a domestic and a foreign firm choose their quality level before engaging a price competition. We first show that the indirect effect of the quota on the sales of the domestic producer are different depending...

We consider the two-stage game proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman (83) in the address-model of horizontal differentiation developed by Hotelling. Firms choose capacities in the first stage and then compete in prices. We show that price competition is drastically softened since in almost all...

We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of horizontal differentiation. We characterize the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna (89). We show that a foreign producer would choose a VER...