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Managementul omnipotent şi puterea stimulentelor etatiste. Hazard moral în interiorul corporaţiei moderne

Mihaela, Iacob; Octavian-Dragomir, Jora - In: Revista OEconomica (2012) 01

The logic of agency problems is that “legally” the principals are (institutionally) hampered from configuring or securing the contractual precautions they wish to enforce out of those available in a pure free market. We review topics pointing that omnipotent management phenomenon is not a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010965625

The employment contract when the firm can utilize a free resource

Mustonen, Mikko - In: Journal of Economics 99 (2010) 3, pp. 239-250

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552579

On the Coexistence of Banks and Markets

Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, … - 2006

We examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets, studying a credit market where the qualities of investment projects are not observable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible. Standard banks can alleviate moral-hazard problems by securing a portion of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005677908

Moral hazard with discrete soft information.

Roger, Guillaume - School of Economics, UNSW Business School - 2011

I study a simple model of moral hazard with soft information. The risk-averse agent takes an action and she alone observes the stochastic outcome; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments, the principal cannot solve these two problems...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010618296

Optimal contract under moral hazard with soft information.

Roger, Guillaume - School of Economics, UNSW Business School - 2011

optimal transfer is option-like, the contract leaves the agent with some ex ante rent and fails to elicit truthful revelation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010618300

Tournaments with gaps

Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - In: Economics Letters 122 (2014) 2, pp. 211-214

A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents’ performance is measured on a cardinal scale …, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041826

The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money

Fagart, Marie-Cécile; Fluet, Claude - In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 49 (2013) 1, pp. 7-16

We provide sufficient conditions for the first-order approach in the principal-agent problem when the agent’s utility has the nonseparable form u(y−c(a)) where y is the contractual payoff and c(a) is the money cost of effort. We first consider a decision-maker facing prospects which cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065449

Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena

Gersbach, H.; Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1998

may make the lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and additional … equity contracts to intermediate debtors. This combination, however, is in turn dominated by a simple debt contract that is … to avoid the contract with the highest chance of delivery: that contract attracts all bad entrepreneurs. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092395

Debt Contracts, Collapse and Regulation as Competition Phenomena

Gersbach, Hans; Uhlig, Harald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

lenders, which may make lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and … additional equity contracts to intermediate debtors, which is in turn dominated by a simple debt contract, only attractive for … seek to avoid the contract with the highest chance of delivery: that contract attracts all bad entrepreneurs. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661861

Moral hazard contracting and credit rationing in opaque credit markets

He, Xin - In: International Journal of Computational Economics and … 5 (2015) 1, pp. 12-34

We make a first step in the literature to analyse a hybrid model of credit rationing with simultaneous presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. Motivated by the observation that credit markets in less-developed countries are rather opaque owing to the lack of necessary institutions to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011207752

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