Unter Fundamentalentscheidungen verstehen wir Entscheidungen bzw. Entscheidungssituationen von existenzieller Wichtigkeit. Dabei stehen wenige grundlegende Handlungsalternativen zur Wahl, die sich jedoch erheblich in ihren Wirkungen unterscheiden. Es handelt sich im Unternehmensbereich um...

This article considers an asymmetric contest with incomplete information. There are two types of players: informed and uninformed. Each player has a different ability to translate effort into performance in terms of the contest success function. While one player’s type is known to both...

This paper investigates a signaling entry deterrence model under learning-by-doing. We show that a monopolist’s practice of entry deterrence imposes smaller welfare losses (or larger welfare gains) when learning effects are present than when they are absent, making the intervention of...

We consider the portfolio optimization problem for the criterion of maximization of expected terminal log-utility. The underlying market model is a regime-switching diffusion model where the regime is determined by an unobservable factor process forming a finite state Markov process. The main...

This paper analyzes the term structure of interest rates in an exchange-only Lucas (Econometrica 46:1429–1445, <CitationRef CitationID="CR32">1978</CitationRef>) economy where consumers learn about a stochastic growth rate through observations of the endowment process and an external public signal. We allow for deluded consumers, who...</citationref>

Some scholars known as <italic>offensive realists</italic> claim that in the uncertainty of world politics, trust and cooperation between states is extremely unlikely. Others, such as <italic>defensive realists</italic>, claim that rational states are capable of finding ways to counteract the complications created by...

This paper considers two-player quadratic games to examine the relation between strategic interactions in actions and in information decisions. We analyze the role of external effects and of the relative intensities with which the players’ actions interact with the uncertain payoff-relevant...

In a correlated equilibrium, the players’ choice of actions is directed by correlated random messages received from an outside source, or mechanism. These messages allow for more equilibrium outcomes than without any messages (pure-strategy equilibrium) or with statistically independent ones...