The paper gives a benefit-cost analysis of ammonia emission control policy in TheNetherlands. Particular care has been given to calculation of the health benefits. Adose-response relationship between air pollution and the number of work loss dayshas been estimated by applying the one-way...

This article deals with the determination of the opportunity costs of government projects. In the past, authors such as S. A. Marglin and M. S. Feldstein developed fromulae for opportunity costs, starting (implicitly) from a particular variant of a neoclassical model. In the article, it is...

This paper estimates the dose-response relationship between air pollution and the number of work loss days for the Netherlands. The study is based on illness data (work loss days) for the Dutch labour population and average year concentrations of air pollution in 29 districts. The dose-response...

Our basic model is a noncooperative multi-player game in which the governments of neighboring counties trade emission reductions. We prove the existence of a market equilibrium (combining properties of Pareto and Nash equilibria) and study algorithms of searching a market equilibrium. The...

This paper discusses trade mechanisms in pollutionpermit markets. Proofs are given, that sequential,bilateral trade in tradeable emissions permitsconverges to a market equilibrium with minimal totalcosts of pollution control. If ambient or depositionpermits are traded, the convergence of...

The concept of international tradable carbon permits has been discussed in scientific circles for over ten years. Since mid 1996, however, it has become a subject of more than just academic interest. The main reason for this change is to be found in the U.S. Draft Protocol to the Framework...

This article compares tradable permits with tradable credits, two distinct economic instruments of environmental policy. It is demonstrated that under credit trading, which is an addition to (relative) emission standards, residual emissions are free of cost. Under permit trading (cap-and-trade),...

In the subsidised housing sector, building corporations can use their market power as purchasers to raise output of subsidised housing to a level higher than it is with perfect competition on both sides of the market. This holds true if the building society is perfectly X-efficient. The...