We establish a new sufficient condition for avoiding a generalized Anscombe’s paradox. In a situation where votes describe positions regarding finitely many yes-or-no issues, the Anscombe’s α-paradox holds if more than α% of the voters disagree on a majority of issues with the outcome of...

We introduce a new consistency condition for neutral social welfare functions, called hyperstability. A social welfare function a selects a complete weak order from a profile PN of linear orders over any finite set of alternatives, given N individuals. Each linear order P in PN generates a...

We define generalized (preference) domains <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$\mathcal{D}$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> as subsets of the hypercube {−1,1}<Superscript> D </Superscript>, where each of the D coordinates relates to a yes-no issue. Given a finite set of n individuals, a profile assigns each individual to an element of <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$\mathcal{D}$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>. We prove that, for any domain <InlineEquation ID="IEq3"> <EquationSource...</equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></inlineequation></superscript></equationsource></inlineequation>

Abstract We extend the Shapley-Scarf model of markets for indivisible goods without money to the case where couples of agents have joint preferences over the set of allocations. We show that the domain of (weakly) lexicographic preferences is maximal (for inclusion) for the existence of Core...