The authors analyze the problem in which agents have nonpublic information and are to play an asymmetric information game. The agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior to playing this game. Revelation is via exogenously specified certifiable statements. The...

Recently, Mankiw-Whinston (1986) and Suzumura-Kiyono (1987) have shown that socially excessive firm entry occurs in unregulated oligopoly. This paper extends this "excess entry" results by looking into strategic aspects of cost-reducing R&D investment that creates incentives towards socially...

Recently, Mankiw-Winston [1986] and Suzumura-Kiyono [1987] have shown that socially excessive firm entry occurs in unregulated oligopoly. This paper extends this "excess entry" results by looking into strategic aspects of cost-reducing R&D investment that creates incentives towards socially...