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According to most academics and policymakers, transparency in monetary policymaking is desirable. I examine this proposition in a small theoretical model emphasizing forwardlooking private sector behavior. Transparency makes it easier for price setters to infer the central bank's future policy...
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This paper qualifies K. Rogoff's (1985) famous result that international monetary policy cooperation is counterproductive. In a model similar to his, it is shown that if wage-setters are nonatomistic and inflation averse--as policymakers are--cooperation leads to higher employment and possibly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005157109
With the increasing prevalence of HIV infection and the high maternal mortality, orphans are a rapidly growing problem in Africa. However, few studies describe the social conditions of these children. Our study focuses on motherless children in urban and rural areas of Guinea-Bissau. A rural and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008593150
This paper considers the implications of international policy coordination when both monetary and fiscal policy choices are endogenous. We show that a movement from insular monetary commitment to international monetary policy coordination will, if fiscal policies are not coordinated, produce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005715183
We consider a standard two-country monetary policy game with fixed nominal wage contracts. The policy regime is either non-cooperative or cooperative. We extend conventional analyses by deriving the natural rate of employment endogenously through monopoly union decision-making. As unions attempt...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005715216
We demonstrate that in important cases Propositions 3 and 4 in Eijffinger, Hoeberichts, and Schaling (2000) may fail. Moreover, their monetary policy delegation arrangement, which advocates that central banker preference uncertainty may be desirable, is dominated by other arrangements without...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005814154