This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz [28]. We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig [14] under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results...

In the financial market of insurance, consumer protection represents an important component contributing to the stability, discipline and efficiency of the market. In this respect, the activity of educating and informing insurance consumers on ensuring and exercising their right to claim plays a...

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (QJE, 1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (EER, 1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed...

Every day insurance companies face a number of risks arising from the insurance industry itself, as well as risks arising from insurance company operations. In this constant fight against risks insurance companies use different models and methods that help them better understand, have a more...