We analyze the effects of a legally-binding price floor using Hotelling's model of locational competition. A moderate price-floor destroys the maximal differentiation equilibrium of d'Aspremont et. al., by allowing firms to compete more aggressively for market share. Minimum differentiation...

This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and...

We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. If firms for informational or institutional reasons are unable to tailor wages according to ability, they will have an incentive to pay for general training in order to attract better quality...

We reconsider the employment effect of a minimum wage on employment in a symmetric model of monopsonistic competition, where each employer competes equally with every other employer. The employment effect depends on the degree of distortion in the labor market. If fixed costs are high (low), the...

We analyze situations where a player must contract with the monopoly supplier of an essential input in order to play an action in a strategic form game. Supplier monopoly power does not distort the equilibrium distribution over player actions under private contracting, but may dramatically...

This paper analyzes behavior on a TV game show where players' monetary payoffs depend upon an array of factors, including ability in answering questions, perceived cooperativeness and the willingness of other players to choose them. We find a substantial beauty premium and are able to...

Bagwell (1995) argues that commitment in undermined by the slightest imperfectness in observation. Guth, Ritzberger & Kirchsteiger (1998) question this assertion: for any finite leader-follower game, with arbitrary many players in each role and generic payoffs, they show that there always exists...