The evolution of broadband penetration has shown substantial differences between OECD countries. This paper empirically investigates to what extent different forms of regulated competition explain these international differences. Three modes of competition are distinguished between broadband...

The evolution of broadband penetration has shown substantial differences between OECD countries. This paper empirically investigates to what extent different forms of regulated competition explain these international differences. It distinguishes three modes of competition between broadband...

Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power or dominant firms from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm...

The stringency of novelty requirements that patent offices use in judging patentability defines the height of patent protection. The author studies patent height in a duopoly where firms compete in product improvements. A competitor who wants to invent around the other's patent is restricted by...

We develop a general economic framework for computing cartel damages claims. We decompose a direct purchaser plaintiff's lost profits from the cartel in three parts: the anticompetitive price overcharge (or cost effect), the pass-on effect and the usually neglected output effect. The pass-on...

The new regulation and guidelines present a mixed picture. Paul Lugard (TILEC) & Theon van Dijk (Lexonomics)

We develop a general economic framework for computing cartel damages claims by purchaser plaintiffs. We decompose the lost profits from the cartel in three parts: the direct cost effect (or anticompetitive price overcharge), the pass-on effect and the usually neglected output effect. The pass-on...