When complete contracting is not possible, allocating control structure becomes the second-best arrangement. This paper analyzes the design of optimal divisional structure within an organization where ex post bargaining between the potential divisional managers is possible. In much the same...

This study develops a two-country model, Home and Foreign, with offshoring and environmental spillover. A final good producer in Home can produce (homogeneous) final goods using customized inputs produced by its partner-supplier in Foreign. The intermediate input price is determined by Nash...

In this paper, we empirically assess the effects of the winner’s curse in auctions for road concession contracts. Such auctions are private- and common-value auctions, and they are on concession contracts which are incomplete contracts prone to pervasive renegotiations (Guasch 2004, Engel...

This paper investigates how firms' demand uncertainty with capacity constraints and their productivity heterogeneity affect their making-or-buying organizational choices in a general equilibrium framework with incomplete contracts. It shows that a final-good producer may adopt integrating a part...

This paper examines what drives author ordering in scientific research. We first discussa theoretical framework for the choice between alphabetical ordering and relative-contribution-based ordering and develop hypotheses, focusing on the nature of research, in particular, the importance of...

This paper analyzes a risk sharing incomplete contract under which an airline agrees to serve an airport in exchange for payment to/from the airport based on the difference between a realized and a target load factor. The key results are that we specified the relevant conditions on payments and...

I explore the effects and optimum features of the borrowing structure in an incomplete contracting framework with a verification opportunity. In this framework, liquidation and verification, both of which are inefficient and consequently the objectives of renegotiation, are devices to implement...

In this paper we want to analyze the internal divisional structure within an organi-