We study a two-issue bargaining situation in which the surplus of one issue is public information, while that of the other issue is private information to one of the parties. Bargaining is by alternating offers under common time-discounting. The bargaining agenda is determined endogenously since...

In this paper we argue that, by modelling the contracting process as a bargaining game, one can endogenize the choice between complete and incomplete contracts. This point is demonstrated within a stylized model in which agents can allocate an endowment stream either via a once-for-all bargain...

While actual bargaining features many issues and decision making on the order in which issues are negotiated and resolved, the typical models of bargaining do not. Instead, they have either a single issue or many issues resolved in some fixed order, typically simultaneously. This paper shows...

In this paper, we study a two issue bargaining situation allowing for an endogenous determination of the agenda under alternative rules for implementing agreements. We uncover the settings in which different agenda structures will be employed in equilibrium, how the order in which issues are...

We use a two-issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining. We uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium, how the order in which issues are bargained over matters, and what impact the rules for...

This paper is concerned with the persistence of inefficient institutions. Why are they not replaced by more effcient ones? What and/or who prevents such change? We provide an answer to these questions based on two key ideas. The principal idea is that institutional change on an issue may...

This paper explores how bargaining frictions and bargaining procedures interact to determine players' bargaining costs in multiple-issue bargaining settings. When bargaining frictions take the form of discounting and agreements are implemented as they are reached, issue-by-issue negotiation can...