Double moral hazard arises in the principal-agent model when both parties provide a nonverifiable input following contracting. Balanced-budget contracts are generally second best. If the principal's input is public to two agents, which often characterizes franchising, for example, then...

This paper constructs a theoretical model of trade and technology transfer to study a developing country’s choice of optimum tariffs and patent length. A Northern firm has a new good, which it must export to or produce in a Southern country. The Southern government simultaneously chooses an...

We study a developing country's choice of optimum tariffs and patent length in a theoretical model of trade and technology transfer. A Northern firm chooses whether to export or produce a new good in a Southern country. In the absence of patent protection, a high tariff is required to induce...

Incentives for resale price maintenance (RPM) are studied in a wholesaler-retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard. The best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers' price if delegated to...