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State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data
Simplice A, Asongu; Oasis, Kodila-Tedika - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
being a function of rent seeking and/or lobbying by de facto power holders is tested. The resulting interesting finding is … that, political interference, rent seeking and lobbying increase the probability of state fragility by mitigating the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261165
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Social capital, lobbying and community-based interest groups
Chamlee-Wright, Emily; Storr, Virgil - In: Public Choice 149 (2011) 1, pp. 167-185
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009327339
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A theory of rent seeking with informational foundations
Lagerlöf, Johan - In: Economics of Governance 8 (2007) 3, pp. 197-218
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005759970
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State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data
Asongu, Asongu Simplice; Kodila-Tedika, Oasis - African Governance and Development Institute (AGDI) - 2013
being a function of rent seeking and/or lobbying by de facto power holders is tested. The resulting interesting finding is … that, political interference, rent seeking and lobbying increase the probability of state fragility by mitigating the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010693284
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Corporate Political Activities and Oligopoly Welfare Loss
Bhuyan, Sanjib - In: Review of Industrial Organization 17 (2000) 4, pp. 411-426
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005705096
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Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids
Haan, Marco A.; Schoonbeek, Lambert - In: Journal of Economics 79 (2003) 3, pp. 215-235
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005715618
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How to avoid transferring a valuable asset
Bucovetsky, Sam; Glazer, Amihai - In: Public Choice 138 (2009) 1, pp. 3-8
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005809537
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How To Avoid Awarding a Valuable Asset
Bucovetsky, Sam; Glazer, Amihai - Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine - 2006
several mechanisms which are efficient, or nearly so. We also show that rent seeking, and lobbying, rather than merely wasting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970927
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On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control
Heidhues, Paul; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067524
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On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control
Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Heidhues, Paul - Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London - 2004
We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051664