To test the joint hypothesis that players in a noncooperative game (allowing mixed strategies) maximize expected utilities and select a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to study the reaction of the revealed collective choice upon changes in the space of strategies available to the players. The...

We introduce and axiomatize two quasi-orderings that extend preferences on a set to its power set. First, a modified version of indirect utility takes into account the number of maximal elements in the opportunity set. This rule meets Puppe's axiom of preference for freedom. Second, an averaging...

A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating...

To test the joint hypothesis that players in a noncooperative game (allowing mixtures over pure strategies) consult an independent preference relation and select a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to study the reaction of the revealed collective choice upon changes in the space of strategies...

The literature on infinite Chichilnisky rules considers two forms of anonymity: a weak and a strong. This note introduces a third form: bounded anonymity. It allows us to prove an infinite analogue of the "Chichilnisky- Heal-resolution" close to the original theorem: a compact parafinite...

This note provides axiomatizations of the discounting utilitarian rule and the Rawlsian infimum rule for an infinite setting. Contrary to the finite case, an objective function cannot at the same time satisfy anonymity and the strong Pareto principle. The Rawlsian rule is based on anonymity, and...