In a Cournot duopoly model of international competition between a domestic and foreign firm, it is shown that when the foreign firm has incomplete information about the marginal cost of the domestic firm then the domestic government can use an export subsidy to signal the competitiveness of its...

A model of strategic trade policy under integrated markets is presented and optimal trade policies are derived under assumptions of both complete and incomplete information. With the assumption of complete information it is shown that the optimal policy is an import tariff (export subsidy) when...

We model subsidy competition for a foreign MNC’s investment in a two-country PTA. Taking into account acquisitions as an alternative investment mode weakens the case for subsidising greenfield investment, even for a single government. Considering competition between member states, it widens...

We model subsidy competition for a foreign MNC's investment in two trading partners. Taking into account acquisitions as an alternative investment mode weakens the case for subsidising greenfield investment. Competition between countries results in welfare losses, which are reinforced by...

Many low-price guarantees are offered by small local firms who compete against much larger rivals. The prices of these larger rivals are often set nationally and thus are independent of local market conditions. Our objective in this paper is to explain why small firms in such environments might...

The past and current reluctance of firms and individuals to use private enforcement suggests that there are limited incentives for self-help. The key contribution of private enforcement to overall deterrence derives from cases which would not otherwise be brought, not simply because of resource...